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Abstract
Transitional justice has shifted from its primary use in
addressing past atrocities of authoritarian regimes to those acts
of violence committed during civil wars. Yet the use of
transitional justice mechanisms in this new context is not well
understood. Drawing from the existing transitional justice
literature, this article generates a set of testable hypotheses to
explore which factors influence the use of particular mechanisms
during and after conflict. It then tests those hypotheses in 151
cases of civil war by using a cross-national data base of all
countries in the world and their adoption of transitional justice
1
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processes from 1970-2007. This article further provides a
preliminary analysis of the success of those mechanisms in
obtaining and securing peace. The article concludes that
amnesties remain more prevalent than trials during and after
conflict, particularly in Africa and Asia. During conflict, higher
death tolls are associated with the use of trials and amnesties,
and longer wars with the use of all types of mechanisms. After
conflict ends, however, longer wars and higher death tolls are
associated with accountability, and the presence of international
peacekeepers is associated with all types of mechanisms. Finally,
we find that transitional justice—regardless of the particular
form it takes—does not jeopardize the peace process, and that
amnesties may be an effective tool to help end conflict.
Introduction
Transitional justice—the set of processes designed to respond to
past human rights violations—has traditionally focused on
political transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy.2 Yet
in the past two decades international and domestic actors have
adapted those mechanisms to the context of civil war. The
United Nations ad hoc tribunals to address ethno-nationalist
conflict in Yugoslavia and genocide in Rwanda, and hybrid
courts to confront secessionist struggles in East Timor illustrate
this shift. Domestic truth commissions have also responded to
ongoing civil wars (e.g., Colombia) and to the aftermath of war
(e.g., Liberia).
This shift toward the use of transitional justice in the
context of civil war will likely endure. After all, the number of
post-authoritarian settings has begun to wane. Most countries
of the third wave of democratization and the relatively short but
explosive fourth wave of democratization have already adopted
transitional justice processes.
Fewer authoritarian state
transitions demanding transitional justice occur today. In
2

Ruti Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” Harvard Human Rights Journal
16 (2003): 69-94.

Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.1, 2012, 137-169

https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/tjreview/vol1/iss1/12
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5206/tjr.2012.1.1.6

2

Reiter et al.: Transitional Justice and Civil War

Reiter, Olsen and Payne 139

contrast, civil wars continue to proliferate around the world,
offering new opportunities for transitional justice. Secessionist
movements and ethnic tensions challenge the territorial integrity
of newly independent states in Central Asia and the Balkans.
Ongoing conflicts in Africa, as Sudan and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo illustrate, demand resolution. Civil war
violence also has spillover effects, extending the conflict into
neighboring countries. In addition, heinous abuses, such as
sexual and reproductive violence, forced conscription of
children, and genocide provoke international moral outrage and
a corresponding global demand for effective solutions.
Transitional justice has offered a potential solution to
these ongoing problems. It seeks to play a key role in the
resolution of, and recovery from, civil war, and it will likely
continue to do so. Yet civil war contexts present particular
challenges for transitional justice. The magnitude of violent
abuses render any attempt to address the past difficult, but the
higher number of abuses associated with civil wars exacerbate
those difficulties. Estimates range from over five million civil
war deaths since World War II3 to more than 16 million.4 In
addition, while authoritarian regime transitions tend to involve
abuses by one set of actors, war tends to involve complicity on
both sides. Rather than a clearly demarcated transition,
moreover, both sides of the conflict in civil wars retain the
potential to remobilize violently against transitional justice
decisions that threaten their interests. An additional challenge
involves ongoing violence. In transitions from authoritarian
rule, new democratic governments tend to implement
transitional justice. In civil war contexts, these mechanisms
3

Bethany Lacina, “Explaining the Severity of Civil Wars,” Journal of Conflict
Resolution 50 (2006): 276-289; Bethany Lacina and Nils P. Gleditsch,
“Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths,”
European Journal of Population 21 (2005): 145-166.
4 James D. Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,”
American Political Science Review 97 (2003): 75-90.
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sometimes occur as a mechanism for ending violence.
Transitional justice provides a new tool in the effort to bring
peace: a truth commission to acknowledge and reconcile war
atrocities; an amnesty to promote disarmament; or trials to
punish and deter certain violent acts.
Despite strong evidence of a shift in the use of
transitional justice toward civil wars, little empirical research
analyzes its use or its impact in this new context. This article
does so. It explores which transitional justice mechanisms
countries adopt during and after civil war. It further analyzes
the factors that shape particular choices. It also provides a
preliminary reflection on transitional justice’s success in
establishing and maintaining peace. To accomplish these tasks
the article draws on the Transitional Justice Data Base (TJDB), a
cross-national data base of all countries in the world and their
adoption of transitional justice processes between 1970 and
2007.5 While the dataset includes information on reparations
and lustration/vetting programs, this article focuses on the
adoption of three main transitional justice mechanisms—trials,
truth commissions, and amnesties—in 151 cases of civil war in
91 countries. These three mechanisms are at the center of the
theoretical debates regarding transitional justice and are those
for which the most comprehensive data was collected. Using
empirical analysis to assess the adoption of transitional justice
processes to civil war contexts offers a first critical step in
establishing where and how transitional justice might bring
peace to worn-torn countries.
Transitional justice and civil war
5

For more information about the coding of mechanisms and the
construction of the dataset see: Tricia D. Olsen, Leigh A. Payne, and Andrew
G. Reiter, Transitional Justice in Balance: Comparing Processes, Weighing Efficacy
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010); Tricia D.
Olsen, Leigh A. Payne, and Andrew G. Reiter, “Transitional Justice in the
World, 1970-2007: Insights from a New Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research 47
(2010): 803-809. The data are available here: http://www.tjdbproject.com/
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Some scholars recommend a new “post-conflict justice” term to
reflect the civil war context that transitional justice mechanisms
increasingly address.6 The International Center for Transitional
Justice (ICTJ) continues to use the old term, but has redefined it.
To its previous definition of transitional justice, the ICTJ adds
“recognition for the victims and [the promotion of] possibilities
for peace, reconciliation, and democracy” to its older definition
of transitional justice as “a response to systematic or widespread
violations of human rights.”7 The shift might also constitute a
fourth phase of Ruti Teitel’s three-phase transitional justice
genealogy.8 It could become part of the “new landscape of
transitional justice” that Naomi Roht-Arriaza identifies.9
Extending transitional justice to new civil war contexts might
further confirm the diffusion of a global accountability norm
and set of models embodied in the “justice cascade”10 and
“justice revolution”11 concepts.
A debate over the particular mechanisms appropriate to
the civil war context has accompanied the shift. Some studies
promote amnesty as a mechanism to ensure peace.12 These
6

M. Bassiouni, Cherif, ed., Post-Conflict Justice (Ardsley: Transnational, 2002).
International Center for Transitional Justice, “What is Transitional Justice?”
http://www.ictj.org.
8 Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
9 Naomi Roht-Arriaza and Javier Mariezcurrena, eds., Transitional Justice in the
Twenty-First Century: Beyond Truth versus Justice (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2006).
10 Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How human rights prosecutions are changing
world politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2011); Ellen Lutz and
Kathryn Sikkink, “The Justice Cascade: The Evolution and Impact of Foreign
Human Rights Trials in Latin America,” Chicago Journal of International Law 2
(2001): 1-33; Kathryn Sikkink and Carrie Booth Walling, “The Impact of
Human Rights Trials in Latin America,” Journal of Peace Research 44 (2007):
427-445.
11 Chandra Lekha Sriram, Globalizing Justice for Mass Atrocities: A Revolution in
Accountability (New York: Routledge, 2005).
12 E.g. Tonya Putnam, “Human Rights and Sustainable Peace,” in Ending Civil
Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements, eds. Stephen John Stedman,
7
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scholars warn against the danger of accountability measures,
such as trials or truth commissions, to post-conflict situations.
They view them as provoking spoilers, who would undermine
the peace process by using violence to threaten, destabilize, or
even topple the current regime and heighten or recommence the
conflict.13 Accountability mechanisms may also backfire and
stimulate, rather than deter, violence if actors view them as
victor’s justice or if they open old wounds between former
warring enemies.14 Assurances of amnesty, on the other hand,
may encourage potential spoilers to accept compromise and
share power in the new political system.15 Peace agreements that
include amnesty can thus “mark a clear turning point between
the conflict-ridden and impunity-plagued climate of the past and
a new, much more peaceable social climate.”16 The failure to use
amnesties, in contrast, could prolong violence and forestall
peace and stability. While these scholars often note the
importance of justice following atrocity, in some cases,
amnesties may be a “necessary evil.”17

Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens (Boulder: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 2002), 237-272.
13 Stephen John Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” International
Security 22 (1997): 5-53.
14 William J. Long and Peter Brecke, War and Reconciliation: Reason and Emotions
in Conflict Resolution (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003); Tom Hadden,
“Punishment, Amnesty and Truth: Legal and Political Approaches,” in
Democracy and Ethnic Conflict: Advancing Peace in Deeply Divided Societies, ed.
Adrian Guelke (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 196-217.
15 Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, “Trials and Errors: Principle and
Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice,” International Security 28
(2003): 5-44; Helena Cobban, “Thinking Again: International Courts,” Foreign
Policy 153 (2006): 22-28.
16 Helena Cobban, Amnesty After Atrocity? Healing Nations After Genocide and
War Crimes (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2007), 199.
17 Mark Freeman, Necessary Evils: Amnesties and the Search for Justice (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2009).
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A different set of scholars view amnesties as a threat to
peace.18 The failure to address past abuses, they argue, leads to
cycles of retributive violence19 or vigilante justice.20 Trials and
truth commissions, on the other hand, provide the means to
reconcile past civil violence and build the foundation for lasting
peace.
This debate over amnesty and accountability echoes an
earlier debate in the democratic transitions literature over the
trade-offs between justice and stability in the post-authoritarian
context.21 Scholars have contemplated whether authoritarian
regime factors or characteristics associated with the transition
process influence countries’ transitional justice choices. In civil
war contexts, we derived a similar set of possible explanatory
factors: the nature of the conflict itself (i.e., the severity of the
violence, the source of incompatibility, the duration, and the
degree of international intervention) and the type of conflict
termination. The discussion of these factors generates a set of
specific, testable hypotheses that seek to explain how and when
countries adopt transitional justice in civil war contexts.
Conflict severity

18 Tove Grete Lie, Helga Malmin Binningsbø, and Scott Gates, “Postconflict
Justice and Sustainable Peace,” Post-conflict Transitions Working Paper No.
5, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4191 (2007).
19 Donna Pankhurst, “Issues of Justice and Reconciliation in Complex
Political Emergencies: Conceptualizing Reconciliation, Justice and Peace,”
Third World Quarterly 20 (1999): 239-256; Richard J. Goldstone, “Exposing
Human Rights Abuses – A Help or Hindrance to Reconciliation?” Hastings
Constitutional Law Quarterly 22 (1995): 607-621.
20 Gary J. Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Jon Elster, Closing the Books:
Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004).
21 For a review of this debate see chapter 1 in Olsen, Payne, and Reiter,
Transitional Justice in Balance.
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Scholars of authoritarian transitions consider the level of
repression to play a critical role in transitional justice choices.
They expect, for example, that a higher number of abuses will
increase the likelihood that the state will adopt transitional
justice mechanisms, specifically trials or truth commissions.22
The explanation behind such choices depends in part on the role
that high levels of atrocities play in mobilizing domestic demand
for accountability among victim and survivor groups. High
levels of violations of human rights will also likely increase
international attention to abuses and pressure on the state to
hold perpetrators of that violence accountable.
Similar to authoritarian state repression, violence varies
across civil war cases. The range includes minor conflicts, in
which a few dozen individuals die, to major wars resulting in the
deaths of millions of civilians and hundreds of thousands of
combatants on both sides. While the authoritarian literature
focuses on the violation of individuals’ human rights by state
security forces, in the civil war context we examine violence
resulting from conflict between state and non-state actors
(rebels). To establish a measure of the severity of conflicts that
allows for comparison across cases, we use battle deaths, defined
as “deaths resulting directly from violence inflicted through the
use of armed force by a party to an armed conflict during
contested combat.”23 The assumptions in the authoritarian
transitions literature would suggest that the greater the level of
violence, the higher the demand for acccountability. This
should hold true during and after civil war, but the effect should
22

Luc Huyse, “Justice after Transition: On the Choices Successor Elites
Making in Dealing with the Past,” Law and Social Inquiry 20 (1995): 51-78;
David Pion-Berlin, “To Prosecute or to Pardon? Human Rights Decisions in
the Latin American Southern Cone,” Human Rights Quarterly 15 (1993): 105130; Carlos S. Nino, Radical Evil on Trial (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1996).
23 Bethany Lacina, “Battle Deaths Dataset 1946-2005: Codebook for Version
2.0,” Centre for the Study of Civil War, International Peace Research
Institute, Oslo (2006).
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be stronger following civil war when accountability mechanisms
are easier to implement.
Thus the following hypothesis
emerges:
Hypothesis 1: Conflicts with more battle deaths are more likely
to lead to trials and/or truth commissions, and are less
likely to lead to amnesties.
Incompatibility
The authoritarian transitions literature notes that certain types of
authoritarian regimes limit the ability of a new democracy to
pursue transitional justice. Those democracies emerging from
military regimes face the reality that the military, as an
institution, will continue to exist. Thus, the military, while
formally stepping down from power, remains a key political
actor and can significantly influence the transitional justice
debate.24 Likewise, certain conflicts greatly inhibit negotiation
between political actors and shape transitional justice options.
Scholars typically distinguish two types of civil war: those fought
over control of the central government (revolutionary) and those
fought over the control of territory (secessionist).
In
revolutionary wars, existing government forces confront one or
more domestic rebel groups who attempt to capture the state.
In these cases, the state would likely punish rebels during and
after conflict to eliminate potential threats and deter future
rebellions. If the rebel group succeeds in capturing the state, it
would likely solidify its power by punishing former state leaders.
In the scenario of revolutionary wars, therefore, neither amnesty
nor truth commissions provide adequate punishment to make
them attractive to either faction.
24

Carmen González-Enríquez, Paloma Aguilar, and Alexandra Barahona de
Brito, “Conclusions,” in The Politics of Memory: Transitional Justice in
Democratizing Societies, Alexandra Barahona de Brito, Carmen GonzálezEnríquez, and Paloma Aguilar, eds., (New York: Oxford University Press,
2001), 303-314
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In secessionist wars, on the other hand, two or more
groups compete over the control of particular geographic
regions. These wars do not challenge the existence of the
current government, but rather its sovereignty over a particular
territory. During these cases, the state may offer amnesties to
breakaway forces in hopes of unifying and consolidating the
country. If victorious in the conflict, the state will likely use
amnesties to appease and incorporate former secessionist forces.
If the breakaway region were to succeed in separating
from the state and establishing a new state, trials or truth
commissions would seem unlikely. Extradition would be
necessary for perpetrators of past crimes to stand trial in one of
the two states. Yet the two countries would be unlikely to reach
extradition agreements and perpetrators would avoid traveling to
hostile territory. In addition, neither sovereign state would likely
put its own combatants on trial for acts committed during these
wars. A truth commission is also improbable due to the amount
of cooperation needed between two states recently at war with
one another. In sum:
Hypothesis 2: Revolutionary wars are more likely to lead to
trials, while secessionist wars are more likely to lead to
amnesties.
Conflict duration
Scholars identify duration of rule as a determining factor in
transitional justice decisions following authoritarianism. They
contend that the longer the prior authoritarian regime ruled, the
greater the constraints on transitional justice.25 Long-standing
authoritarian regimes are often deeply-institutionalized.
Authoritarian legacies thus linger beyond the transition,
permeating political, social, and cultural life, and stymieing the
emergence of independent judiciaries willing and able to
challenge former regime leaders. In addition, after long periods
25

Ibid.
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of authoritarian rule, civil society is often weak. These factors
lead the new democratic government to accommodate, rather
than confront, old authoritarian forces, pursuing strategies of
amnesty rather than trials or truth commissions.
Conflict and post-conflict settings experience some
parallels in terms of duration. Conflicts vary perhaps more
dramatically than authoritarian regimes, ranging from single,
violent events to decade-long wars. Long conflicts tend to lead
to more cumulative abuses and a greater number of victims,
motivating more domestic and international demand for
accountability. Additional factors, however, may temper these
demands. William Zartman refers to long intractable conflicts as
“ripe for resolution” when peace appears more attractive to both
sides than continued fighting.26 Scholars argue that “ripeness” is
particularly high in situations of military stalemate where both
sides face a determined opponent and where the eventual victor
is difficult to predict.27
Societies exhausted from long wars, therefore, may not
risk peace by implementing potentially destabilizing
prosecutions. We would expect states emerging from these
conflicts to avoid the use of trials. Furthermore, lengthy wars
likely involve a high number of individuals complicit in the
abuses in some way, thus rendering the determination of which
perpetrators
to
hold
accountable
infeasible
and
counterproductive. In such a scenario, states would likely select
amnesties and truth commissions. Longer wars also typically
26 I. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Stephen John Stedman, Peacemaking
in Civil Wars (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991).
27 George Modelski, “International Settlement of Internal War,” in
International Aspects of Civil Strife, James Rosenau, ed. (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1964): 122-153; I. William Zartman, “The Timing of Peace
Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments,” in Contemporary
Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes, John Darby and Roger
MacGinty, eds. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003): 19-29.
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indicate greater parity between the sides, making amnesties more
likely. In addition, states may use truth commissions to attempt
to reconstruct national history fragmented by violence. This
situation leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Conflicts of longer duration are more likely to
lead to amnesties and/or truth commissions, and are less
likely to lead to trials.
International intervention
The scholarship on authoritarian regime transitions assumes an
integral role for international forces in determining transitional
justice choices by countries addressing past human rights
violations. This results from the expansion of international law,
the work of IGOs and INGOs, the rise of international and
hybrid courts, and the emergence of universal jurisdiction.
Many scholars argue that countries face increasing pressure to
hold perpetrators of human rights violations accountable for
their acts. To date, however, few studies have measured,
systematically and comparatively, the influence of international
actors on state decision-making regarding transitional justice in
war situations. Case study evidence suggests, however, that
where international actors promote accountability, trials will
occur.28 The literature further assumes that a strong civil society
with transnational linkages will advocate accountability for
perpetrators of human rights violations.29
These assumptions about the role of international
factors in transitional justice adoption apply particularly well to
28 Victor Peskin, International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans: Virtual Trials and
the Struggle for State Cooperation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008);
Sriram.
29 David Backer, “Civil Society and Transitional Justice: Possibilities, Patterns
and Prospects,” Journal of Human Rights 2 (2003): 297-313; Michelle Sieff and
Leslie Vinjamuri Wright, “Reconciling Order and Justice? New Institutional
Solutions in Post-Conflict States,” Journal of International Affairs 52 (1999): 757779.
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civil war cases. Some scholars contend, for example, that liberal
states tend to promote trials in conflicts in which their own
citizens and soldiers face harm.30 Thus if the international
community has invested significant resources, particularly
troops, with the goal of ending a conflict, it tends to play a larger
role in affecting decisions about truth and justice. Specifically,
international actors prefer trials or truth commissions to
amnesties.31 If the accountability norm exists—and it is
transmitted to state actors—states would likely choose domestic
trials and truth commissions regardless of whether the
international community operates such mechanisms itself to deal
with the conflict. This should also hold for ongoing conflicts as
well as post-conflict settings, although states will likely
implement accountability mechanisms after conflict, if they can,
to avoid tensions. While international pressure takes many
forms, we take a conservative approach and examine the
presence or absence of peacekeepers. If international pressure
does affect transitional justice choices we should observe some
effect in the broader set of cases. This leads to the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: Conflicts where international peacekeepers are
present are more likely to lead to trials and/or truth
commissions, and less likely to lead to amnesties.
Conflict termination
In post-conflict scenarios, transitional justice mechanisms
should increase because the end of violence facilitates the state’s
30

Bass
At times, the international community may actually take the lead and
institute transitional justice mechanisms itself. The International Criminal
Court and the International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda
represent two such institutions of accountability. Because domestic actors
have little role in creating these ad hoc bodies, we exclude them from this
analysis, since our focus is on measuring the impact of international actors on
domestic decision-making.
31
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ability to pursue all types of mechanisms. Conflicts end in a
variety of ways, however, increasing the challenges for
transitional justice. The fighting may end due to the military
victory of one side over the other, or alternatively, fighting may
end because of a ceasefire or negotiated settlement. Wars that
end in military victory face fewer constraints in adopting
prosecutions or truth commissions. The winning party has
relatively free reign to enact justice without fear of violent
retribution or destabilization.
State victory will lead to
prosecutions that aim to punish past challenges to state authority
and deter future rebellion.32 A rebel victory over the state will
create even greater incentives to hold former state actors
accountable as a form of retribution. The new regime may also
utilize such actions to establish a break with the past and
discredit the old regime, thus paving the way for an easier
consolidation of its new power.
Conflicts ending in negotiation often involve complex
settlements with an array of power-sharing and power-dividing
institutions.33
Negotiated settlements range from simple
ceasefires or complex peace agreements. Many of these
agreements include amnesty for one or both sides of the conflict
as a condition for signing. The cooperation, coexistence, and
compromise inherent in negotiated settlements would render
prosecutions highly unlikely, but allow for truth commissions,
particularly if they involve amnesty and protection of
perpetrators’ identities.34
These approaches to conflict
termination suggest the following hypothesis:

32

Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide
and Mass Violence (Boston: Beacon Press, 1999).
33 Caroline A. Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing
Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars (University Park: The
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007).
34 Rajeev Bhargava, “Restoring Decency to Barbaric Societies,” in Truth v.
Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions, Robert I. Rotberg and Dennis
Thompson, eds. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000): 45-67.
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Hypothesis 5: Conflicts ending via negotiated settlements are
more likely to result in truth commissions and/or
amnesties, while conflicts ending in victory are more
likely to lead to trials.
Insights from the authoritarian transitions and civil war
literatures generate a set of hypotheses regarding transitional
justice choices in the contemporary civil war context. Testing
these hypotheses helps to discern the factors that most likely
affect state decision-making surrounding transitional justice
mechanisms. Before turning to that analysis, the next section of
the article explains our sample selection, the data compilation
process of the TJDB, and the data sources for the explanatory
variables we use to test the five hypotheses.
Sample and data
To analyze transitional justice in countries engaged in internal
armed conflict we use a subset of the TJDB. We describe that
subset below, as well as the operationalization of the explanatory
factors that may lead to the adoption of transitional justice
mechanisms during and post-conflict.
Sample
To test the hypotheses surrounding civil war and transitional
justice decisions, our universe of cases comprises all internal
armed conflicts that occurred from 1970-2005. These include
those conflicts ending during this period as well as those in
which fighting is ongoing. We examine cases of internal armed
conflict and internationalized internal armed conflict as defined
by the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset.35 That dataset
35 Nils

P. Gleditsch et al., “Armed conflict, 1946-2001: A New Dataset,”
Journal of Peace Research 39 (2002): 615-637. Battle death data is only available
through 2005, thus we exclude those conflicts beginning after 2004. In
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defines armed conflict as “…a contested incompatibility that
concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed
force between two parties, of which at least one is the
government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related
deaths.”36
The data base includes minor conflicts (25-999 battle
deaths per year) and major wars (more than 1,000 battle deaths
in at least one year). We code a new, separate conflict after a
five-year gap between years of at least 25 battle deaths.37 This
selection process yields 151 cases of internal armed conflict in 91
countries. The 151 cases include 67 major wars and 94 minor
conflicts. A full listing is included in the appendix.
Utilizing this selection method means that the sample
includes coups and coup attempts, minor armed revolts, and
small skirmishes. The literature on transitional justice literature
tends to ignore these types of cases despite the frequent use of
transitional justice mechanisms in their aftermath.
The
government of Trinidad and Tobago, for example, granted an
amnesty to Muslim insurgents who forcefully took over
parliament in 1990. The State Security Court in Tunisia
convicted 39 individuals for their role in an insurgent attack that
seized the city of Gafsa in January 1980. Kenya established a
Special Judicial Commission of Inquiry to examine the activities
of former minister Charles Njonjo and his role in the attempted
Air Force-led coup in August 1982. Responses to minor
conflicts occur frequently, include great variation, and can have
profound political implications. Had Hugo Chavez failed to
receive an amnesty following the coup attempt he led in
addition, we do not include four cases for which no battle death data is
available; Israel-Southern Lebanon (1990-1999); Mauritania-Western Sahara
(1975-1978); Pakistan-Baluchistan (2004-2007); Ethiopia-Afar (1975-1976).
36 UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, Version 4-2009. We
exclude extra-systemic (often termed colonial) wars and interstate wars.
37 This corresponds to the onset5 coding delineated in Håvard Strand ,
“Onset of Armed Conflict: A New List for the Period 1946-2004, with
Applications,” unpublished manuscript (2006).
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February 1992, for example, he would probably not have
ascended to power in Venezuela. In addition to the frequently
decades-long civil wars at the forefront of transitional justice
research, (e.g., Colombia, Guatemala, Cambodia, and Uganda),
around 25 percent of the conflicts in the data base last only a
year or less. The average conflict is eleven years in length, while
the median conflict lasts five years.
Dependent variable
The dependent variable in this analysis is a series of
dichotomous variables that denote the transitional justice
mechanisms, if any, that states use to address past abuses for
each conflict. We include only those mechanisms directly
related to the conflict, excluding others that the state may have
implemented to address other conflicts or abuses committed
under an authoritarian regime. We focus on five mechanisms:
trials (for state agents and rebels), truth commissions, and
amnesties (for state agents and rebels). For each case in the
dataset, we note the use of these mechanisms at any time during
the conflict. For those cases that have terminated, we also
analyze the use of these mechanisms any time after termination
until the present.
The TJDB defines trials as occurring when a court of
law holds perpetrators of human rights violations criminally
accountable. The state may use trials to hold rebels as well as
agents of the state accountable for acts committed during the
conflict. We include only domestic trials, excluding those
operated directly by international actors, and only trials that
conclude with a verdict.38 The TJDB defines truth commissions
as newly established, temporary bodies officially sanctioned by
38

We should note, however, that only one state (Sierra Leone) experienced an
internationally operated trial without also pursuing its own domestic
prosecutions, thus including or excluding international mechanisms does not
change the results of the analysis.
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the state to investigate a pattern of human rights abuses.39 This
definition closely matches others in the field.40 It excludes preexisting government institutions that investigate past human
rights violations as part of their official duties. The TJDB
includes amnesties in its dataset, despite the fact that many
transitional justice studies exclude them. As Jack Snyder and
Leslie Vinjamuri41 and others have claimed, and previous
research using the TJDB confirms,42 state leaders consider
amnesty a tool for resolving past atrocities. The database codes
amnesties when a state officially declares that those accused or
convicted of human rights violations, whether individuals or
groups, will not be prosecuted, further prosecuted, and/or will
be pardoned for their crimes and released from prison. As with
trials, states can grant amnesties to one or both sides of the
conflict.
The TJDB was constructed by systematically analyzing
Keesing’s World News Archives, a catalog of world events.43
Keesing’s provides the coverage—geographic and temporal—
necessary to develop a cross-national dataset of transitional
justice over nearly four decades. Utilizing news sources from
around the world, including newspapers and wire services, and
government reports, Keesing’s provides an unparalleled source
of unbiased summaries of world events. Finally, Keesing’s
constitutes a respected and reliable resource for coverage of
39

We exclude non-state, independent projects, which investigate and uncover
the truth about past violations since they do not represent official decisions
on behalf of state actors.
40 See, for example, Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge
of Truth Commissions (New York: Routledge, 2001).
41 Snyder and Vinjamuri.
42 Olsen, Payne, and Reiter, Transitional Justice in Balance; also see: Tricia D.
Olsen, Leigh A. Payne, and Andrew G. Reiter, “The Justice Balance: When
Transitional Justice Improves Human Rights and Democracy,” Human Rights
Quarterly 32 (2010): 980-1007.
43 Keesing’s World News Archives includes Keesing’s Contemporary
Archives (1931-1987) and Keesing’s Record of World Events (1987-Present).
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political, social, and economic events used widely in the field,44
making it an ideal resource for information on transitional
justice mechanisms. The dataset begins in 1970. While
transitional justice mechanisms occurred prior to that year, this
time frame captures the commencement of the era in which
these mechanisms began to assume a more frequent and
prominent role in the aftermath of atrocity, and heightened
attention by scholars and policymakers.
Independent variables
To measure the severity of the conflict we use a count of battle
deaths taken from the Battle Deaths Dataset 1946-2005.45 From
this measure, we calculate the log of the average annual battle
deaths for the duration of the conflict. The Uppsala/PRIO
Armed Conflict Dataset also provides a conflict incompatibility
variable determining whether the conflict refers to control over
government or territory.46 We measure the duration of the
conflict in whole years starting from the first year the conflict
reached the minimum threshold of at least 25 annual battle
deaths until the last such year, according to Uppsala/PRIO
Armed Conflict Dataset figures. For inactive conflicts, we
utilize data on conflict termination drawn from the UCDP

44

Jan Oskar Engene (2007). “Five Decades of Terrorism in Europe: The
TWEED Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research 44 (2007): 109-121; Barbara
Walter, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2002); Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis,
Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2006).
45 Lacina, “Explaining the Severity”; Lacina and Gleditsch
46 The Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset codes for three types of
incompatibility, government, territory, and both government and territory.
The latter category, however, applies only to some extra-systemic wars in the
Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset and does not apply to any of the
cases of internal conflict used in our analysis.
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Conflict Termination Data Set; we code for military victory or
negotiated termination via ceasefire or peace agreement.47
To measure international influence we include an
indicator variable for whether UN peacekeeping missions
occurred in each case.48 Other international actors, such as the
African Union or third party states, can also intervene in
conflicts. Likewise, the UN can play other roles in mediating
conflicts outside of sending a full peacekeeping mission. The
UN, however, has taken far more initiative on transitional justice
than any other organization or state, and the presence of actual
troops ensures a particular depth of interest in the case. Finally,
based on the UN Statistics Division’s region codes, we include
regional controls by categorizing each case according to whether
it took place in the Americas, Europe, Africa, or Asia.49

47 This is not a dichotomous variable; many cases fall outside these categories
because the number of battle deaths simply drops below the threshold
required for inclusion. There the conflict becomes inactive, but there is no
clear victor and there has not been a negotiated end to the fighting. See:
Joakim Kreutz, “UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset Codebook for Version
2.1,” Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Department of Peace and Conflict
Research, Uppsala University (2006); Joakim Kreutz, “How Armed Conflicts
End,” unpublished manuscript (2006).
48 For a complete list of UN Peacekeeping Missions, past and present, see:
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/pastops.shtml.
49 Composition of UN regions can be found at the UN Statistics Division
here: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm. Note that
we combine Asia and Oceania into one region—Asia—to better facilitate
comparison.
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Analysis and findings
Using the data described above, we test the hypotheses derived
from the literature. The section below presents descriptive
statistics on our dependent variable, as well as the results of two
multivariate models on the use of transitional justice during and
after conflict. We make several observations. First, the
summary statistics highlight important differences in mechanism
use during and after conflict, as well as trends over time.
Second, the multivariate analyses illustrate that not all of the
causal factors identified in the existing literature prevail in the
analysis of transitional justice in the civil war context. After
discussing these findings, we conclude by exploring the
contribution of these findings in building a new analytical
framework for transitional justice in civil war contexts.
Descriptive statistics
The conflicts in our sample vary widely in terms of severity.
Battle deaths range from 25, the minimum needed in one year to
qualify as an armed conflict, to over 500,000, as in the long
conflict in Afghanistan. Just under half of the conflicts (65 of
151) in our analysis were fought over territory, while over half
fought over control of the central government (86). Of those
that terminated (118 cases), in nearly four in ten conflicts (45
cases), one side was victorious over the other, while three in ten
(36 cases) ended via negotiation. The remaining cases (37)
ended simply due to inactivity, with no clear victor and no
negotiated settlement—the conflict simply petered out. Of
those that terminated in victory, states hold a nearly three-to-one
advantage over rebels (33 to 12, respectively). The UN
intervened in nearly one in five conflicts (28 of 151); in eight
cases, the UN intervened while the conflict was ongoing; in 13
cases, following the cessation of violence; and in seven cases, the
UN intervened both during and after the war.
A variety of transitional justice mechanisms designed to
address the violence accompany civil wars. Well over half of our
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cases (94 of 151) involve the enactment of at least one
transitional justice mechanism, and quite often countries adopt
more than one mechanism (50 of 151). In many cases, states use
amnesties in conjunction with truth commissions (22), truth
commissions and trials (9), and trials and amnesties (18). Truth
commissions occur most frequently in the worst conflicts
measured by battle deaths and the longest wars. Trials of rebels
occur most often following short, minor conflicts (see Table 1).
Table 1. Summary Statistics:
Transitional Justice and Civil War
During Conflict

After Conflict

Reb.
Trials

State
Trials

TC

Reb
Amn.

State
Amn.

Reb.
Trials

State
Trials

TC

Reb.
Amn.

State
Amn.

9

8

11

54

17

11

11

14

41

17

Avg. Ann.
Battle Deaths

2,161

3,944

4,784

2,290

4,594

1,823

2,304

5,183

2,071

3,000

Revolutionary

2

6

10

35

14

5

6

12

28

10

Avg. Conflict
Duration (Yrs)

13

17.5

24.5

16

19.9

3.6

8.6

10.1

6.5

8.2

UN
Peacekeepers

4

1

3

8

4

5

7

6

15

9

Peace
Agreements

2

2

0

18

7

4

4

5

15

8

Victory

2

1

0

7

2

5

4

6

19

8

Cases

Overall, amnesty granted toward rebels appears as the
most common mechanism used during and after conflict.
Relative to other mechanisms, states use amnesties most
frequently during the conflict, but the gap shrinks in the postconflict setting.
Countries adopt state trials and truth
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commissions in post-conflict settings nearly twice as frequently
as during conflicts. Surprisingly, however, states frequently
adopt trials and truth commissions even during ongoing conflict.
Amnesties occur as frequently during conflict as they do after
civil wars.
The prevalence of amnesty suggests that the
accountability norm has not spread as far in the civil war context
as perhaps this literature would lead us to expect. Figure 1
further illustrates this point. The figure shows that the
accountability norm, measured by the count of trials, has not
reached the same level as amnesties. Trials have increased in
number, beginning in the 1990s, but amnesties appear to have
increased more rapidly. Combined with the information
depicted in Table 1, amnesties seem to retain their appeal in civil
war contexts, despite the diffusion of a global accountability
norm.
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Figure 1. Trials and Amnesties for Civil Wars
Wars,, During and
After Conflict (1970-2005)

Multivariate analyses
To test the hypotheses generated ea
earlier, we estimate a series of
probit models in which each one of the five transitional justice
mechanismss is the dependent variable. We first assess the
hypotheses outlined above for the use of transitional
ansitional justice
mechanisms during the conflict. Next, we explore the role war
characteristics play in the adoption of transitional justice
mechanisms after the conflict terminated
terminated. The results of the
probit
it analyses are shown below in table
tables 2 and 3.
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Table 2. Probit Analyses of Mechanism Implementation
During Civil Wars
1

2

3

4

Trials – State
Agents

Truth
Commission

Amnesty –
Rebels

Amnesty –
State Agents

Avg. Annual Battle
Deaths (log)

0.195**
(-0.084)

0.164
(-0.144)

0.074
(-0.064)

0.303***
(-0.083)

Revolutionary/
Secessionist

0.435
(-0.520)
0.020**
(-0.009)

1.126**
(-0.609)
0.046***
(-0.013)

0.478**
(-0.240)
0.046***
(-0.016)

0.790
(-0.485)
0.032**
(-0.013)

0.025
(-0.633)
-3.433***
(-0.815)
151
-27.64
16.30***
0.12

0.241
(-0.506)
-4.242***
(-1.138)
151
-26.69
15.60***
0.32

0.159
(-0.410)
-1.625***
(-0.433)
151
-82.49
21.04***
0.16

-0.086
(-0.457)
-4.258***
(-0.861)
151
-39.15
22.67***
0.26

Duration
UN Peacekeepers
Constant
N
Log-likelihood
Χ2
Pseudo-R2

NOTE: * = significance at 90% level; ** = significance at 95%;
*** = significance at 99%. Robust standard errors, clustered by
country, in parentheses. The model for rebel trials was not
significant (most likely due to the low number of observations),
and therefore, is not included here. Regional control variables
were not included in the models because numerous regions
predict failure perfectly (i.e., no mechanisms of a particular type
were ever used during conflict in the region).
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Table 3. Probit Analyses of Mechanism Implementation in
the Aftermath of Civil Wars
1

Trials – State
Agents
Avg. Annual Battle
Deaths (log)

0.362**
(-0.173)

2

Truth
Commissions

3

Amnesty –
State Agents

0.311*
(-0.167)

0.168
(-0.118)

4

Amnesty –
Rebels
-0.025
(-0.074)

Revolutionary/
Secessionist

0.670

0.620

-0.318

0.307

(-0.566)

(-0.477)

(-0.492)

(-0.367)

Duration

0.032*
(-0.018)

0.004
(0.019)

0.007
(-0.025)

-0.011
(-0.016)

1.338***

0.853*

0.887**

1.425***

(-0.491)

(-0.509)

(-0.400)

(-0.408)

Peace Agreements

-1.774**
(-0.817)

-0.686
(-0.682)

0.531
(-0.691)

0.413
(-0.370)

Victory

-0.476
(-0.558)

-0.177
(-0.557)

1.023
(-0.699)

0.628*
(-0.366)

UN Peacekeepers

Africa
Asia
Americas
Constant
N

-1.602***

-0.359

0.355

-0.106

(-0.561)

(-0.491)

(-0.529)

(-0.431)

-2.839***

-1.210**

-0.602

0.0322

(-0.992)

(-0.555)

(-0.687)

(-0.440)

-0.865

0.507

0.0986

(-0.735)

(-0.688)

(-0.515)

-2.884***

-2.965***

-2.970***

-0.988**

(-0.963)
118

(-0.886)
95

(-0.748)
118

(-0.487)
118

Log-likelihood

-24.09

-30.41

-37.72

-63.89

Χ2

17.85**

18.86**

17.20**

21.35***

0.33

0.23

0.22

0.16

Pseudo-R2

NOTE: * = significance at 90% level; ** = significance at 95%;
*** = significance at 99%. Robust standard errors, clustered by
country, in parentheses. The model for rebel trials was not
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significant (most likely due to the low number of observations),
and therefore, is not included here. The Americas region was
dropped from the truth commission model because it predicts
success perfectly (i.e., every country in the region has used one).
During conflict, we find that three factors are
particularly important in determining the adoption of specific
transitional justice mechanisms. First, the results in table 2 show
that that those conflicts with higher death totals are more likely
to employ trials for state agents. Paradoxically, however, we also
find that we are more likely to observe amnesties for state agents
in deadlier conflicts. This may suggest that severity increases the
need to hold perpetrators accountable, but at the same time
increases fears of re-instigating violence with too much justice.
States thus limit efforts by balancing trials with amnesties.
Second, our analysis illustrates that the duration of the
conflict has a significant effect on all mechanisms. In other
words, the longer the conflict lasts the more likely the state is to
attempt a wide range of mechanisms in hopes of bringing the
fighting to an end. This finding reveals interesting patterns with
regard to the use of transitional justice. While most of the
scholarship assumes states adopt transitional justice following
atrocities, this finding suggests that country leaders may view
transitional justice as a mechanism that could also stop the
violence.
Conflicts fought over control of the central government
are more likely to lead to the use of truth commissions and
amnesties for state agents while the conflict is ongoing. This
finding contradicts predictions in the literature that revolutionary
wars lead to trials. Instead, we find that states may adopt official
investigations, in conjunction with amnesties, to cover the
abuses of their own agents. Holding a truth commission may
have the effect of quieting international and domestic demands
for accountability.
Interestingly, we also find that UN
intervention during the conflict is not associated with
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accountability or any form of transitional justice. These findings
would indicate that international actors do not push for
particular mechanisms until they secure peace, or that the host
state simply ignores these overtures while fighting continues.
Now, we turn to the post-conflict results (Table 3).
Similar to the analysis above, we hypothesized that those
countries with higher levels of violence would be more likely to
adopt trials and truth commissions in the post-conflict setting.
We find supporting evidence that those post-conflict cases with
higher battle deaths are indeed more likely to prosecute state
agents and hold truth commissions. We thus find that severity is
likely to lead to accountability. The literature also suggests that
duration matters. Specifically, protracted wars would likely
prompt countries to adopt amnesties and truth commissions.
We find instead that longer wars are more likely to lead to trials
of state agents.
As hypothesized, the presence of UN peacekeepers does
have a positive effect on the likelihood a country will use trials
or truth commissions. Interestingly, their presence also predicts
the use of amnesties for both sides. We conclude that the
presence of peacekeepers does not merely push a state towards
accountability, but makes states more likely to pursue a wide
range of transitional justice mechanisms. Finally, we do not find
evidence that negotiated ends to civil wars lead to amnesties as
we hypothesized. Instead, we find those conflicts that end in
victory are highly correlated with amnesties for rebels. This
suggests that governments grant amnesties to any remaining
rebels after they have defeated the insurgency. Our control
variables also suggest that geographical region is associated with
the adoption of particular mechanisms. Africa and Asia prove
less likely to adopt trials of state agents, suggesting that the
accountability norm has not penetrated these regions as much as
it has others.
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Does transitional justice bring peace? Preliminary
reflections
One goal of transitional justice is to increase the prospects and
endurance of peace. The frequency with which civil wars occur
highlights the importance of addressing this question. Yet this
question poses a number of insurmountable challenges. Of the
151 civil wars included in this analysis, 118 terminated, and of
that group, only seven wars began again.50 In other words, there
is very little variation with which we can gain leverage on the
ability of transitional justice mechanisms to bring sustained
peace. When conflicts end, countries tend to maintain peace
with or without transitional justice mechanisms.
We thus find very little evidence that transitional justice
choices following conflict termination make conflicts any more
or less likely to recur. This finding suggests that countries may
pursue transitional justice without risking renewed violence.
Neither trials nor amnesties, in other words, jeopardize the
peace process. We do find some evidence that transitional
justice, specifically amnesties, may aid in securing peace when
used during conflict. Of the 36 conflicts that terminated in a
peace agreement, half (18) granted amnesties to rebels before the
conflict ended. In other cases, states use amnesties to
successfully demobilize guerrilla groups or factions, which may
have the effect of lessening the intensity of the conflict.
Conclusion
The evidence presented in this article informs our understanding
of transitional justice used in post-conflict settings. In particular,
we find that countries increasingly use transitional justice in such
contexts. Over half of the cases of civil war in the data base
employed at least one form of transitional justice mechanism,

50

As noted above, we code a new, separate conflict after a five-year gap
between years of at least 25 battle deaths.
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with a third using more than one mechanism. This trend, alone,
is largely understudied and worthy of additional research.
This analysis also uncovers how characteristics of the
conflict and its termination influence transitional justice choices.
Our findings further demonstrate that during conflict, high
death totals, the duration of the conflict, and the nature of the
war increase the likelihood that a country will adopt transitional
justice. Higher death totals predict trials and amnesties for state
agents. This finding suggests that states approach the peace
process by balancing accountability for some perpetrators with
amnesties for others. The long duration of the conflict increases
the likelihood that states will adopt all types of mechanisms.
This may either reflect the balance discussed above, sequencing,
or experimenting with different efforts to promote peace.
Additional research is necessary to determine the relationship of
these mechanisms to each other. Finally, we show that states
use amnesties to resolve ongoing revolutionary wars, not trials,
as expected. States appear to recognize that the only successful
mechanism for demobilization of revolutionary forces is a
negotiated amnesty, rather than the threat of accountability.
The post-conflict setting, however, generated a different
set of findings. Countries experiencing high levels of battle
deaths and protracted wars tended to adopt accountability
measures. Such cases likely produce the necessary moral outrage
to heighten pressure for trials. War fatigue may also explain the
desire to punish those engaged in violence and to deter future
violations. The finding on UN peacekeepers provides insight
into the role of international forces behind transitional justice.
They play no statistically significant role with regard to
transitional justice during the conflict. After the conflict,
however, they prove significant in promoting amnesty and trials.
The international community, in other words, has not presented
a clear and unambiguous accountability norm as some of the
literature suggests. Moreover, while the existing literature
assumes that African states emerging from war face pressure to
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hold perpetrators accountable due to this global norm, our
research suggests less, rather than more, accountability in Africa
and Asia than in other regions of the world.
The frequent use of amnesties after civil war is a
noteworthy finding. Indeed, it suggests that there is a role for
amnesty in conflict termination, despite claims that it may inhibit
peace. While other transitional justice mechanisms also play a
role in post-conflict settings, the consistent use of amnesty—
even in the presence of international actors—suggests amnesty
may play a complementary role to accountability mechanisms.
Uncovering how amnesty works in tandem with other
transitional justice mechanisms would be a fruitful avenue of
future research. This analysis also demonstrates that transitional
justice has neither advanced nor deterred peace in civil war
contexts. Future research might determine its impact on other
important areas affecting post-conflict societies, specifically
crime, citizen trust in the government, human rights abuses, and
rule of law.
Appendix: Civil War Cases, 1970-2005
Afghanistan (1978-2005)
Algeria (1991-2005)
Angola (1975-2002)
Angola (1991-2005: Cabinda)
Argentina (1974-1977)
Azerbaijan (1992-1994: Nagorno)
Azerbaijan (1993-1995)
Bangladesh (1975-1992:
Chittagong)
Bosnia and Herzegovina (19921995: Serbia)
Bosnia and Herzegovina (19931994: Croatia)
Bosnia and Herzegovina (19931995: Western Bosnia)
Burkina Faso (1987)

Burundi (1991-2005)
Cambodia (1967-1998)
Cameroon (1984)
Central African Republic (20012005)
Chad (1966-2005)
Chile (1973)
Colombia (1964-2005)
Congo, Democratic Republic of
the (1977-1978)
Congo, Democratic Republic of
the (1996-2005)
Congo, Republic of the (19932002)
Côte d'Ivoire (2002-2004)
Croatia (1992-1995: Serbia)
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Egypt (1993-1998)
El Salvador (1972)
El Salvador (1979-1991)
Eritrea (1997-2003)
Ethiopia (1964-1991: Eritrea)
Ethiopia (1976-1991)
Ethiopia (1976-2005: Ogaden)
Ethiopia (1977-1991: Oromiya)
Ethiopia (1989-1996: Afar)
Ethiopia (1996-1999: Somali)
Ethiopia (1999-2005: Oromiya)
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(1998-1999: Kosovo)
Gambia (1981)
Georgia (1991-1993)
Georgia (1992: South Ossetia)
Georgia (1992-1993: Abkhazia)
Georgia (2004: South Ossetia)
Ghana (1981-1983)
Guatemala (1965-1995)
Guinea (2000-2001)
Guinea-Bissau (1998-1999)
Haiti (1989-1991)
Haiti (2004)
India (1969-1971)
India (1978-2005: Tripura)
India (1982-2005: Manipur)
India (1983-1993:
Punjab/Khalistan)
India (1989-2004: Bodoland)
India (1989-2005: Kashmir)
India (1990-2005)
India (1990-2005: Assam)
India (1992-2005: Nagaland)
Indonesia (1975-1998: East
Timor)
Indonesia (1976-1978: West
Papua)
Indonesia (1990-1991: Aceh)
Indonesia (1999-2005: Aceh)
Iran (1979-1980: Arabistan)
Iran (1979-1996: Kurdistan)
Iran (1979-2005)
Iraq (1961-1996: Kurdistan)

Iraq (1982-1996)
Iraq (2004-2005)
Israel (1949-2005: Palestine)
Kenya (1982)
Laos (1959-1973)
Laos (1989-1990)
Lebanon (1975-1976)
Lebanon (1982-1990)
Lesotho (1998)
Liberia (1980)
Liberia (1989-2003)
Macedonia (2001)
Madagascar (1971)
Malaysia (1974-1975)
Malaysia (1981)
Mali (1990-1994: Azawad)
Mexico (1994-1996)
Moldova (1992: Dniester)
Morocco (1971)
Morocco (1975-1989: Western
Sahara)
Mozambique (1977-1992)
Myanmar (1948-1994)
Myanmar (1949-2005: Karen)
Myanmar (1959-2005: Shan)
Myanmar (1961-1992: Kachin)
Myanmar (1992-1996: Karenni)
Myanmar (1997: Wa)
Nepal (1996-2005)
Nicaragua (1978-1989)
Niger (1992-1997: Air and
Azawad)
Niger (1996-1997: Eastern Niger)
Nigeria (1967-1970: Biafra)
Nigeria (2004: Niger Delta)
Nigeria (2004: Northern Nigeria)
North Yemen (1962-1970)
North Yemen (1980-1982)
Oman (1972-1975)
Pakistan (1971: East Pakistan)
Pakistan (1974-1977: Baluchistan)
Pakistan (1990-1996)
Panama (1989)
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Papua New Guinea (1989-1996:
Bougainville)
Paraguay (1989)
Peru (1981-1999)
Philippines (1969-2005)
Philippines (1970-2005:
Mindanao)
Romania (1989)
Russia (1993)
Russia (1994-2005: Chechnya)
Russia (1999: Dagestan)
Rwanda (1990-2002)
Saudi Arabia (1979)
Senegal (1990-2003: Cascamance)
Sierra Leone (1991-2000)
Somalia (1978-2005)
South Africa (1966-1988:
Namibia)
South Africa (1981-1988)
South Yemen (1986)
Soviet Union (1990: Azerbaijan)
Soviet Union (1990-1991:
Nagorno-Karabakh/Armenia)
Spain (1980-1981: Basque)
Spain (1987-1992: Basque)
Sri Lanka (1971)
Sri Lanka (1984-2005: Eelam)

Sri Lanka (1989-1990)
Sudan (1963-1972: Southern
Sudan)
Sudan (1971-1976)
Sudan (1983-2005)
Syria (1979-1982)
Tajikistan (1992-1998)
Thailand (1974-1982)
Thailand (2003-2005: Patani)
Togo (1986-1991)
Trinidad and Tobago (1990)
Tunisia (1980)
Turkey (1984-2005: Kurdistan)
Turkey (1991-1992)
Uganda (1971-2005)
United Kingdom (1971-1991:
Northern Ireland)
United Kingdom (1998: Northern
Ireland)
United States (2001-2005)
Uruguay (1972)
Uzbekistan (2000-2004)
Venezuela (1992)
Yemen (1994: South Yemen)
Yugoslavia (1991: Croatia)
Zimbabwe (1967-1979)

Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.1, 2012, 137-169

Published by Scholarship@Western, 2013

33

